Palestine: A Modern History (ص 103)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 103)

المحتوى

216 The Great Palestine Revolt 1936-1939
representative leaders except rebel leaders in the ‘hills. The very nathe
of ‘moderates? has becometa térm of” abuse. 14,
‘ Ries
‘As the Ralestinet Government’ Were against negotiations with the
Mufti, MacMichaeF suggested bringing. the more obliging neighbouring
Arab rulers into'the. picture. Herfater suggested negotiations with’ the
Arab Mayors of Palestinian cities and towns.'?®
As the European crisis worsened, MacDonald warned. MacMicttael
that the proposed reinforcements might have to be diverted and the
‘rapid organisation: of a Jewish volunteer Defence Force may be necessary
despite all“objects®.'!° In viewsof the fact that Egypt: might, become
an important theatre of.war, in addition to. Iraq’s particular.importance,
the British Govefnment were eager to restore friendly relations with the
Afabs?°.U. At the same-time in case of war friendship and support of the
Uitited States; where ‘the ‘Jews'tare considerable factor’,'”? would also
be a matter of vital concern.
Nevertheléss, British strategic’interests demandéd the achievement of
reconciliation with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring
coutitries and thé termination of the rebellion. Ma¢Dorvald proposed to
suspend immigration should warbreak out.
Hainirig and MacMichael were afithe opinion that tlie postponement
of partitiomand the complete cessation of immigration offered the only
hépe of evefitual peace in Palestine. Haining warned: that this did not
imply'Jan immediate settling dowrtof the Arabs.:Thesecond phase of
the reVellion, he!Submitted? was Jes¥ dependent on outside help thah in
1936, and there was no‘ one-‘to influence the rebels who are nationally
minded people?!” ,
Certdin Arab ‘statesmen shaied. Britair’s anxieties regarding the
coritinuance of hostilities in-Palestine-at @’time-when’a European war
seemet itHminerit. In Oétober, Fawfiq: Sweidi, the Iraqi Foreign
Minister; was-a frequent visitot to thé- Colofiial Office, and there were
teports tHaf a téffiporary céssation éf Jewish immigration was being
cohsidered, A feeling’ that considerable“concessions-to-the Arab view-
point were imminent prevailed both among Arabs andJews.
Chamberlain’s policy of appedsement. towards Hitler succeéded in
preventing —/témporarily —'the outbreak of awaribetween the Euro-
pedn powefs. Before MacMichaél-rétumed to Palestine on 14 October, a
policy:Had been set'in Londort designed to bririg-an early end to the
rebellion and to keep the Arabs quiet:during the expected war with
Germany.
pe "ha
The Great Palestine Revolt: 1936-1939:
Reconquering the-Country
During October, the rebels infiltrated Jerusalem and by 17 October the
Police had been driven out and-thetebels had gainet! complete control
of the Old City. On’ the following day it was annotinced that the
military authorities*had taken over control.of the Jérusalem district
from the civil power. Four days later military control was extended to
the rest of the country, and the campaign-to re-éstablish British rule,
which amounted to a ‘virtual mfiifitary reoccupation’’®® of Palestine,
commenced +.
With two divisions, squadrons -of airplanes, -British «Police, Trans-
Jordan frontier fottes, as well as six thousand Jewish auxiliary forces
under his command, Haining set out to re-éstablish control over the
cities "by a co-ordinated drive against the rebel§ which involved the
occupation, cordon afid search of virtually all"the latger villages of
Galilee-and Samaria. These operations enaWled Haifiing to statt a general
disarmament’ cdinpaign and encouraged: the anti-Mufti forces to make
their presence felt by providing information and identifying éaptured
rebels. “
The mountinp’ pressure on the tebels expdsed’their inner organisa-
tional weaknessés and’ the serious consequences of the absence of a
political leadership able to mobilise the masses as well as the absence of
an effective ‘military leadtrship able to face the challenge of over-
whelming modern British might. Confusion arising out of abuse in ‘the
collection of coritributions and taxes harmed*the prestige and the
authority ‘of ‘the rebels. Bitéessive indulgence in some: unnecessary
political assassinations eficodfaged the pro-Government Arab elements
to openly efy the rebels. ;
On9 November 1938 the.Report of tHe Palestine Partition Commission
was published,’ accompanied by a covering statement of Policy from
the Government. The Report ruled‘out the Peek partition scheme as
impractical and décordingly’ the statement of policy announted that the
Government had-decided to abandon partition and to continue with the
Mandate as it was and make an efdeavour to arrive at a solution
betwéen Arabs? dnd Jews byholding a cénference of Arab and Jewish
leaders to which représentatives from the independent ‘Arab States
would be invited. The purposé éf the proposed conférefice was not an
Arab-Jewish entente, but rather the imposition of a British solution, in
which both parties would acquiesce, calculated to take the wind out of
the sails of the Arab rebellion in the hills.125 ° “
The Palestinian Afabs welcdmed the abandonment of Partition and
derived comfort from’the fact that represéntatives of the Arab States

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

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