The Arab Nationalists Movement 1951-1971: From Pressure Group to Socialist Party (ص 94)

غرض

عنوان

The Arab Nationalists Movement 1951-1971: From Pressure Group to Socialist Party (ص 94)

المحتوى

87
the U.A.R., and as such, they were conditioned to accept
whatever Nasser accepted. But still not a few of ANM militants
find reason to question the ANM tactics if not the strategy.
They believe that the ANM should never have accepted to join
forces with the discredited traditional leaders. Instead
they suggest that the ANM could have fought independently or
in conjunction with the Ba'th and other progressive forces. 7?
As the hostilities between the warring factions came
to an end in Lebanon with the election of a new president on
July 31, the ANM prepared itself for yet another battle, the
battle over Iraq.
The July 14 Revolution was expected to lead Iraq to
join the union. However, Brig. Kassem, supported by the
Communists, chose to defend Iraq's independence by welcoming
friendly relations with all countries. The arrest of
Col. Arif who had supported a policy of immediate union with
the U.A.R. exposed the intentions of Brig. Kassem, and split
the Iraqis into two factions: the unionists and the anti-
union.
Soon after the July 14 Revolution, the national
leadership of the ANM dispatched Hani al-Hindi, one of its
most experienced and able leaders, to Iraq to help the ANM
leadership there in drawing a new plan of action for the
region. Al-Hindi's presence in Iraq was instrumental in
bringing the Arab Nationalists to the fore. In the first
19 ased on personal interviews with a number of
former ANM members, December 20 and 21, 1970.

هو جزء من

The Arab Nationalists Movement 1951-1971: From Pressure Group to Socialist Party

تاريخ

1971-02-07

المنشئ

Basil R. Al-Kubaisi

مجموعات العناصر

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