Palestine: A Modern History (ص 54)

غرض

عنوان

Palestine: A Modern History (ص 54)

المحتوى

110 = Deadlock: 1920-1923
a belief that the Administration has btoken faith in the. matter of
immigration.:, that justice is subject to coercion from political
Zionism and that the British Government will only yield to
violence.’
But violence was not possible without an organisation which aimed
at rebellion and had the necessary means to carry it out, ‘All available
information confirms the impressibn that there is no organisation.which
exists to cause it’.'°? Clearly this was a case of failure of l¢adership; the
traditional leadership was anti-revolutionary, and the-forces advocating
revolutionary tactics failed to produce the required leaders.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the Administration’s attitude
regarding the Muftiship and the Supreme Muslim Council and: the
friendly relations with Hajj Amin played an important rolé in
preventing outbreaks and rebellions at a time when the state of public
opinion and popular sentiments were conducive to upheavals and
violence.
A number of ‘responsible’ Muslims were involved in constructive
work which included educational.work for the formation of a Muslim
college and development of a Boy. Scout Movement — religious and
economic projects. An Arab Economic Society was«'founded and
discussions were taking place on the possibility ‘of forming an Arab
National Bank and of establishing Bonded Stores. These activities,
Deedes reported, stimulated efforts towards ther attainment of an
increased measure of cohesion and solidarity particularly among the
Muslims.!°8 ’
The beneficial outcome of this rapprochement with Hajj Amin and
his associates on the one harid, and’ the fear that this positive develop-
ment might be wrecked bythe complete failure of the Arab Delegation’s
mission, on the other hand, spurred Samuel to visit London. Samuel’s
departure engendered a mood of expectancy and among many, of
anxiety. Apart from Arab protestations against’ the Government’s
condonation of the existence of the Jewish Defence Force (Haganah),
and the installation of benches for the accommodation of-Jews wailing
before the walls of the Sanctuary (Muslim shrine), no major develop-
ments took place during the month of May.
Churchill’s White Paper
As pressure against Britain’s pro-Zionist policies mounted, Churchill
sought to bring about an end to unrest in Palestine, and to criticism in
the British Press and House of Lords, by publishing an authoritative
4
f Deadlock: 1920-1923 11d
} statement: on British policy in Palestine. ‘In his 1922 White Paper,
f Churchill maintained that the Balfour Declaration, which the Govern-
ment intended to uphold, did not aim at subordination of the Arab
E population ‘or culture. The Jews, however, were in Palestine ‘as of right
and not on sufferance’” and would be able to increase their number
4 E by immigration subject to the ‘economic absorptive capacity’ of the
f. country. The White Paper declared that it was the intention of HM
f Government to foster the gradual establishment of full measure of
® self-government. A legislative council with a majority of élected
# members would be set up immediately, and a committee of elected
@ members of the legislative council would confer with the Administration
@) upon matters relating to regulation of immigration. In case of differ-
# ences between the committee and the Administration, HMG were to be
J the final judge.
The Churchill White Paper was accepted by the Zionists and rejected
F by the Arabs.’!° The Delegation‘was simply not empowered to accept
L any British policy based on the Balfour, Declaration. Regulated Jewish
F immigration would still entail the prospect of eventual Jewish majority
® and thus Jewish domination in Palestine. Furthermore, the promise of
f elected majority did not provide for the Arabs who constituted the
# majority of the people, an elected majority in the legislative council
* asa whole.
While the White Paper failed to reconcile ‘the Arabs to Jewish
E immigration and to slower development of the JNH, it was necessary
. for the purpose of defeating the opposition which had developed in the
‘ British Parliament to accepting the.Mandate with the inclusion of the
# Balfour Declaration. During the latter part of June, Lord Islington had
aised the question of Palestine in the House of Lords and obtained the
#: passage of a resolution which declared the Palestine Mandate. unaccept-
ble. However, an attempt ro bring the Palestine Mandate before the
louse of Commons for parliamentary examination failed.
Turing Point
hortly afterwards, the League of Nations approved the Palestine Man-
ate, and the British Government«nade it clear that the Mandate would
e carried out in the light of the 1922 Statement of Policy."
As it became decisively clear that the British Government did not
Hintend:to rescind the Balfour Declaration, the Executive Comniittee of
| f the Fourth Congress met between 23 and 27 Juné to decide‘upon the
F'Ssteps to be taken in the event of the expected ratification of the Mandate.
# The resolution adopted at that meeting included the organisation of

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

Generated Pages Set