Palestine: A Modern History (ص 88)

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عنوان

Palestine: A Modern History (ص 88)

المحتوى

186 Prelude to Revolution: 1930-1935
78. See Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 5 February 1934,CO 733/254.
79. Cabinet. Palestine, 28 March 1934,CO 733/258, p.2.
80. See Darwaza, op.cjt., pp.109-10.
81. Interview with Emile Ghoury, Beirut, August, 1967.
82. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 5 January 1934/CO 733/258, pp.3-4.
83. The Government resented this unsolicited help from Arab volunteers to
apply the law against illegal Jewish immigration and subsequently prohibited
the formation of these'patrols.
84. OAG to Cunliffe-Lister, 12 September 1934, CO 733/257.
85. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 25 August 1934, Enclosure A, CO 733/265.
86. Hajj Amin insisted on the representatives being directly elected by the people
while Ragheb Nashashibi preferred an appointed Legislative Council owing to
his weak position with the electorate.
87. Cabinet. ‘Palestine Legislative Council’, 14 November 1934, CO 733/265. The
Prime Minister was of the opinion that the Zionist demand for ‘parity’ with
the Arabs in the Legislative Council ‘was a good thing’. Also see Departmental
note by Downie, ‘Palestine Legislative Council’, 4 October 1934, CO 733/265.
88. Mogannam, op.cit., p.237.
89. See Documents, op.cit., pp.359-68.
90. see Sifri, op.cit., pp«196-201.
91. See Falestin, 3 July 1935.
92. Wauchope tq Cunliffe-Lister, 6 March 1935, CO 733/272.
93. For a xeport on the Conference of the “‘Ulama, see Wauchope to Cunliffe-
Lister, 4 March 1935, CO 733/278.
94. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, April 1935, CO 733/278.
95. Ghoury related the gist of a conversation between ‘Abdul Qader and a few
young revolutionaries with Hajj Amin in 1934 to the effect that the Mufti
thought their enthusiasm to fight the British face-to-face was premature.
96. For the Constitution of the Association, see Documents, pp.97-101.
Not to be confused with the Egyptian association bearing the same name.
97. Some of Qassam’s followers reported that the revolutionaries of the early
thirties were impatient members of Qassam *s secret organisations who
opposed their leader’s call for further preparations before declaring the
Revolution. See SubhiYasin, Harb al Isabat fi-Falastin (Guerrilla Warfare in
Palestine), Cairo, 1967, pp.68-70.
98. See Naji Allush, Al-Mugqawama al-‘Arabiyaa fi Falastin, 1917-1948 (The Arab
Resistance in Palestine), Beirut, 1967, p.102. The Italians were much assailed
in Palestine for their oppression of the Muslim Arab population of Libya, in
addition to a violent anti-Italian campaign waged by Falastin in the wake of
the Ethiopian invasion.
99. Subhi Yasin, al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubra fi Falastin, 1936-1939. (The
Great Arab Revolt in Palestine), Damascus, 1959, p.23.
100. 7 December 1935, CO 733/294.
101. Ibid.
102. Wauchope to J.H. Thomas, 7 December 1935, CO 733/294.
103. Ibid.
104, See Rice to Chief Secretary, 14 December 1935, CO 733/297.
7 THE GREAT PALESTINE REVOLT: 1936-1939
The gathering clotids of autumn’ 1935, presaged the impending storm of
1936. The’ number of landless Arab peasants and the number of
unemployed Arabs in the big cities was on the increase. The Arabs were
becoming increasingly convinced that if no restrictions on Jewish
immigration were imposed they would soon become a minority in their
own country, and that if no limitations were imposed on land sales, the
Arab peasants would be uprooted and evicted from their homeland.
The econdmic crisis ‘of 1935 further aggravated the situation. Qassam’s
revolt, though abortive, pointed out the only way’ left to the
Palestinians to resist a Zionist take-over of their country, and many of
Qassam’s associates and disciples were ‘still at large ready to take up
‘arms against the JNH and the British at the earliest opportunity. Rising
tides of nationalist strugglé in Egypt and Syria against foreign rule
encouraged radical Muslim and Arab ‘nationalist elements to adopt
similar methods to attain the Same end$ in: Palestine. The Mediterra-
nean crisis precipitated by Italy’s Ethiopian campaign gave rise to
hopes that a European War, which was believed to be immiment, would
provide an opportunity for the Arabs to realise their long-sought
political and national aims. The smugpling of arms on a relatively large
scale by the Jews attracted attentici to the prospect of armed conflict
between the Arabs on the one hand aid the Jews and the British on the
other.
Alive to the dangerous state of Arab opinion in Palestine the High
Commissioner was authorised, ond month after Qassam’s revolt, to
make an announcement -régarding the setting up of a legislative council,
which was folldwed shortly by a proposal .in connection with the
limitatidn of land sales. The Jewish leaders categorically rejected the
scheme while emphasising ‘their désire and determination to maintain
cooperation with Government in all matters save only that of the
Legislative Council’.’ \
The proposals were critically received by the Arabs, but even Jamal
Husseini, who was’ very critical of the scheme, thought it well to give
Wauchope a private assurance ‘that ‘nothing ‘that he said should be
regarded as rejection of the proposals’.? Arab objections to the compo-
sition 4nd ‘powers of the Legislative Council notwithstanding, the
scheme itself and the Land Transfer Legislatidn proposais had a
187
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تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

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